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Immigration reform has generated much political debate in recent years.  The last 
substantial revision of immigration law occurred in 1986 with the passage of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which authorized several policy instruments to discourage 
illegal immigration and employment.  In the twenty years since however, it is apparent that 
IRCA has failed in its stated objectives for not only has illegal immigration increased 
significantly, but unauthorized immigrants have continued to gain employment in the U.S. 
particularly in the low-skilled, low-wage sectors of the economy (Passel, 2005; Passel and Suro, 
2005; Passel, 2006; Mines, Gabbard and Steirman, 1997; Carroll et al. 2005).   
The political debate began in earnest with the passage of two earlier proposals in the 
109
th US Congress.  Legislative proposal H.R. 4437 (the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and 
Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005) was passed by the US House of Representatives in 
December 2005.  It is arguably one of the more restrictive proposals introduced for consideration 
in the 109
th Congress in that it contained no provisions for legalization of unauthorized workers 
or for a guest worker program.  H.R. 4437 emphasized a pro-enforcement stance on immigration 
reform; it advocated criminal penalties for unauthorized immigrants and significant fines for the 
U.S. employers who would hire them.  The proposal also argued for I-9 document reform and for 
increased worksite/interior/border enforcement, but made no mention of modifications to 
existing laws on legal immigration.   
In contrast, S. 2611 (the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006) passed by the 
U.S. Senate in May 2006 proposed earned legalization for unauthorized immigrants and 
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 modifications to existing laws on legal immigration. Though it favored stricter enforcement and 
I-9 reform, overall, it was not as severe as H.R. 4437 in the overall approach to illegal 
immigration.  Specific provisions for the agricultural sector were proposed under AgJOBS 
(Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits and Security Act of 2005 (S. 359/H.R. 884; S.2611 
Subtitle B), which would streamline the H-2A program to improve wages, working conditions 
and minimum benefits (housing and transportation) for farm workers and establish a pilot 
program for earned legalization of eligible unauthorized workers.   
Neither S.2611 nor H.R. 4437 was passed since Congress failed to reach a compromise 
between the two sets of views on immigration.  The failure to achieve compromise can be linked 
directly to the competing interests that lawmakers had to contend with: disagreements on policy 
provisions between anti-immigration/pro-enforcement groups and pro-immigration groups, 
disagreements on specific reform measures between and within political parties in Congress, and 
intense lobbying from employer and worker advocacy groups for certain concessions.  In many 
respects, the most divisive issue has been proposed legalization for unauthorized immigrants.  
There are segments of the American public that strongly oppose legalization on the grounds that 
it would reward illegal behavior and encourage future illegal immigration, as there are others that 
view legalization as the only viable means of bringing unauthorized immigrants into mainstream 
U.S. society, that is, in lieu of mass deportations.   
Amidst these divergent views, employers of low skilled foreign labor – particularly farm 
employers – have expressed preference for increased access to immigrant labor to offset labor 
shortages.  This issue is particularly important to farm employers that have high demand for 
manual labor over short periods during harvest time.  Immigrant workers presently comprise a 
significant proportion of the crop farm workforce (78%), an estimated 53% of which is 
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 unauthorized for US employment (Carroll et al. 2005).  Farm employers are justifiably 
concerned since these statistics clearly highlight their vulnerability to changes in immigration 
policy that may curtail their access to foreign labor.     
Given this context, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the implications of U.S. 
immigration policy reform for U.S. farm labor market outcomes, focusing specifically on 
proposed legalization for unauthorized immigrant workers. The study uses a treatment effects 
(TE) framework in which legalization is modeled as a treatment or (policy) intervention.  The TE 
framework is a novel approach to immigration policy evaluation that has not been used in 
previous studies that have evaluated the potential impact of legalization for farm outcomes.  The 
paper is organized as follows.  Following this introduction, the second section comprises the 
analytical framework employed in the study, and the third section presents the study findings.  
Policy implications and concluding remarks are given in the final sections of the paper.              
Treatment Effects Approach 
The treatment effects approach measures the impact of “treatment” on outcomes of 
interest.  In this context, treatment may refer to medical treatments, public programs or social 
interventions (Basu et al. 2007), and the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome is defined 
as the treatment effect.   The standard problem involves the inference of a causal connection 
between participation (treatment) (D) and the potential outcome (Y), where the potential 
outcomes for the participant (treated) ( ) 1 Y  and non-participant (non-treated) ( states are 
compared for the i
) 0 Y
th individual to evaluate how his average economic outcome would change if 
he were to participate in a program or not.  Following the latent variable framework of Heckman, 
Tobias and Vytlacil (2001; 2003) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2002), the potential outcomes 
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In this setup, represent the relationship between the observable characteristics and 
the potential outcomes and 
() () x g    , x g 0 1
ε , u , u 0 1  , Z and x are unobserved and observed random variables, 
respectively.  The errors are assumed to be independent of x and Z.  Ceteris paribus, the 
treatment or causal effect is defined as shown by equation (4.2), and is the difference between 
the potential outcomes:  
N   1,..., i               Y Y i 0 i 1 i = − = ∆          ( 2 )  
This effect is not directly estimable as it is impossible to simultaneously observe an individual in 
both states.  The observed outcome is actually: 
            ( 3 )   () i 0 i i 1 i i Y D 1 Y D Y − + =
where the unobservable portion of the effect is referred to as the counterfactual outcome.  (For 
those individuals receiving treatment   is the counterfactual outcome; for those who do not,   
is the counterfactual outcome.)  The treatment effect of each person is independent of the 
treatment of other individuals, implying that an individual’s potential outcomes are affected by 
his participation decision only and not the decisions of other individuals (Wooldridge, 2002; 
Caliendo, 2006).   
0 Y 1 Y
  Gains from treatment are typically defined as population averages.  Some relevant 
parameters include:   
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   Average Treatment Effect (ATE).  This is the expected gain from participating in a 
program for a randomly chosen individual (Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil, 2001), 
calculated as the differences in expected outcomes before and after treatment: 
() () ( ) 0 1 ATE Y E Y E E − = ∆ = α          ( 4 )  
 
  Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET).  This is the average gain from 
treatment for those who select into the treatment (Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil, 2001):  
() () ( ) 1 D | Y E 1 D | Y E 1 D | E 0 1 ATET = − = = = ∆ = α       ( 5 )  
 
  Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATEU).  This is the effect for non-
participants which may be useful for future policy decisions on extending treatment to 
groups that were excluded from treatment  (Caliendo, 2006):  
() () ( ) 0 D | Y E 0 D | Y E 0 D | E 0 1 ATEU = − = = = ∆ = α       ( 6 )  
 
  Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE).
 1 This is the expected effect of treatment conditional 
on observed (X) and unobserved (Ud) characteristics of participants (Heckman and 
Vytlacil, 2005).
2 One interpretation is that it is the mean gain for an individual with 
characteristics X and unobservables Ud such that he is indifferent between treatment or 
not given a set of Z values, z, where Φ(α’z)=ud.  It is defined as: 
() ( ) ( )
() () [] d di i 0 i 1 0 1 d i d
d i d 0 1 d d d
u U | u u E X u U , x X | E
u U , x X | Y Y E u U , x X | E U , X MTE
= − + − = = = =
= = − = = = ∆ ≡
β β γ
     (7) 
 
The challenge posed by selection bias is evident from the ATET which shows a 
hypothetical outcome in the absence of treatment for those individuals who received treatment 
(Caliendo, 2006).  With non-experimental data, this outcome is not equivalent to the outcome of 
non-participants:   
  ( ) ( ) 0 | 1 | 0 0 = ≠ = D Y E D Y E          ( 8 )  
Selection bias may arise since participants and non-participants may be deliberately selected 
groups with different outcomes, even in the absence of treatment, due to observable and 
unobservable factors that may determine participation (Caliendo, 2006):  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
    
     	   
  	 
bias    Selection
D Y E D Y E
ATET
D Y Y E D Y E D Y E 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 0 0 1 0 1 = − = + = − = = − =  (9) 
                                                 
1 Bjorklund and Moffitt (1987) are credited with introducing this concept to the literature. 
2 The unobserved characteristics are introduced into the model by the decision rule described by equation (1).   
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 Much of the previous literature on treatment effects assumed homogeneous responses to 
treatment, meaning that based on certain observable characteristics, effects are constant across 
individuals and that they would derive identical benefits from treatment.  Recent studies have 
given more attention to heterogeneous responses where the effects vary across individuals due to 
their observable or unobservable characteristics.  Much of the focus is now on the role of 
unobservable characteristics in determining outcomes particularly in cases where individuals are 
otherwise identical in their observed characteristics (Basu et al. 2007; Caliendo, 2006).  Basu et 
al. (2007) describe two instances in which heterogeneity (arising from unobservable 
characteristics) may factor into treatment evaluation.  The first instance is where individuals with 
identical observable characteristics respond differently to treatment but do not opt for treatment 
based on their idiosyncratic benefits or gains (non-essential heterogeneity).  The second instance 
is where individuals have identical observable characteristics and respond differently to 
treatment and are aware of the benefits to be derived from treatment.  In this latter case, their 
treatment choices are influenced by anticipation of idiosyncratic gains (Basu et al. 2007).  Basu 
et al. (2007) and Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006a; 2006b) refer to the second instance as 
essential heterogeneity.    
In the context of this paper, heterogeneity of foreign farm worker responses to 
legalization is maintained and subjected to a statistical test.  In the presence of heterogeneity, it is 
assumed that they obtained legalization because of individually perceived wage benefits, and that 
in the future, workers without legal status would proceed similarly in the presence of a program 
such as AgJOBS. The analysis follows a parametric approach developed by Heckman, Urzua and 
Vytlacil (2006b) to estimate the choice and outcome models, and the treatment effects of 
legalization; alternative non-parametric estimates are also evaluated.   Their MTE algorithm was 
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 used for the analysis.
3   The overall models and estimation procedure are described in the 
following sections, and draw heavily on the theoretical expositions of Heckman, Urzua and 
Vytlacil (2006a; 2006b).   
 Parametric model with heterogeneous treatment effects 
The parametric model with essential heterogeneity adopts the familiar latent variable 
framework shown:  
()
()
() otherwise                                             0 D
         status legal   for   opts    worker the   if                            D   if     1   D
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      (11) 
where the Z and X are vectors of observable characteristics and  i i u u 0 1 , , ε  are error terms that 
encapsulate the unobservable characteristics of individuals.  The decision to accept treatment 
(legal status) is defined by a choice model that allows for two separate log wage 
outcomes . ( 0 1 ln , ln Y Y )
4  The choice model may be interpreted as a net utility for individuals with 
the characteristics Z and ε.  Similarly, the (log wage) outcomes are functions of the i
th worker’s 
characteristics denoted by Xi and uji ( ) 1 , 0 = j , respectively. The error of the choice model (ε) is 
assumed to be independent of Z given X.  The parametric model assumes joint normality of the 
errors( i i u u 0 1 , , ) ε , which are assumed to be independent of the observable characteristics (Z and 
X).  Based on this assumption, the expectations on the errors of the outcome equations reflect the 
differences in legal status choice (D=1 if legalized/treated, D=0 if not legalized/untreated):  
                                                 
3 Information on the MTE is available at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/underiv/  (Cited as Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 
2006c in reference list). Also, see Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006a; 2006b). 
4 Parameters  ()   Z µ and ε   are assumed to be additively separable as is the predominant specification in the 
literature. 
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1 ; = =   are the correlations between the disturbances of the respective 
outcome equations and the choice equation, and  (.) φ  denotes the standard normal density 
function (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006b).   
The probability of becoming legalized is defined as:  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) Z Z Pr z Z | 1 D Pr z Pr ' ' α ε α ε Φ = > = = = =       ( 1 4 )  
where  is the cumulative distribution of () . Φ ε .  Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006a) refer to 
this function as a propensity score, taken as a monotonic function of the mean utility of treatment 
(legal status).  This is reflected in the acceptance decision:  
() () ( ) [] ( ) [ d U Z P 1 Z 1 D > = Φ > Φ = ] ε µ ε ε        ( 1 5 )  
where Ud denotes the unobserved characteristics of individuals.  The algorithm estimates the 
propensity score using a probit model, from which the predicted values for the treated and 
untreated groups are used to define values over which the marginal treatment effect (MTE) of 
legalization may be identified (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006b).   
Since it is impossible to observe an individual in the treated and untreated states 
simultaneously, the actual outcome to be estimated:  
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where  () i i i i u u X 0 1 0 1 − + − = β β γ  is the heterogeneous return to legal status for the i
th foreign 
farm worker (i.e. the effect varies across all farm workers).  If the heterogeneous effect were 
from a differential between the  j β terms only, this would be ‘observed heterogeneity’; if it were 
to arise as a consequence of differences between the uji terms, it would be ‘unobserved 
heterogeneity.’ In either case, this parameter would imply different wage effects of legalization 
across foreign workers in the farm workforce even if they have identical observable 
characteristics.  Note that for individuals who gain legal status (D=1),  i γ  captures the benefit of 
legal status.   
Treatment effect parameters  
The literature on marginal treatment effects (MTE) spearheaded by Heckman provides 
several interpretations of the MTE which are equivalent under certain assumptions that apply in 
this analysis (see Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) and references therein).   One interpretation of 
the MTE presents it as a measurement of the marginal return to individuals who are indifferent 
between foregoing (D=0) or accepting treatment (D=1) when their mean utility (µd(Z)) is 
equivalent to Ud .  If   are defined as value outcomes, it may be interpreted as a ‘willingness 
to pay’ measure for individuals with certain observable characteristics (X) and unobserved 
heterogeneity (U
j Y ln
d ) at a specified margin of indifference (Heckman and Li, 2004; Heckman, 
Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006a). The other treatment effect estimators – the average treatment effect 
(ATE), the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) and the average treatment effect on 
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 the untreated (ATEU) – are generated as weighted averages of the MTE (Heckman, Urzua and 
Vytlacil; 2006a; 2006b):  
         ( 1 7 )   () ( d d
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d d i du u x u U x X E ATE , , |
1
0 ∫ ∆ = = = = γ )
)
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Data 
The data consist of 19,152 foreign workers with complete data from the National 
Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) for 1989 to 2006.  Subsamples reflecting the treated 
(those who have obtained legal status; N1=8097) and untreated (those without legal status; 
N0=11055) worker groups are specified.  Table 1 defines the variables that were used in the 
analysis.  The variables reflect the demographic characteristics of the crop farm workforce and 
certain characteristics of the farm labor market.  Dummy variables reflecting the location, time 
period of interview, and time period when the foreign workers would have entered the US to live 
or work are also included.       
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables that were used in the analysis.  The 
treated group comprised 8,097 foreign workers whereas the untreated group comprised 11,055 
foreign workers.  One of the more interesting findings to emerge from the data is the difference 
in time spent abroad by workers of the two groups: workers who are not legalized have much 
longer overseas stays than their cohorts who are legalized (5 weeks on average).   In addition, 
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 workers who gained legal status reported more months and weeks of farm work in the previous 
year on average than their cohorts who did not gain legal status.  Although workers had similar 
foreign farm work experience, there was a sizeable difference in US farm work experience.  On 
average, legalized workers reported 16.7 years of US farm work compared to 6 years for workers 
who were not legalized.  Not surprisingly, legalized workers had migrated to the US much earlier 
(~12 years more) and had worked with their current employers for much longer periods (~4 
years) in comparison to their cohorts who did not gain legal status.   On average, 62% of the 
foreign farm workforce had migrated to the US to live and work after 1986.  Among legalized 
workers, only 26% had migrated to US after 1986, whereas approximately 88% of unauthorized 
workers had entered the US since that period.   
Tables 3 reports the estimated choice model results from the MTE algorithm.  The 
instruments included in this model are farm work weeks, years with employer, years since 
immigration, after 1986 and weeks spent abroad.  The characteristics that significantly increase 
the likelihood of legalization (treatment) are years with employer, English, and years since 
immigration; those that decrease the likelihood of treatment are farm work weeks, after 2001 and 
weeks spent abroad.  The after 2001 dummy variable was included to distinguish between the 
pre- and post- 9/11 periods, and the after 1986 dummy was included to distinguish between the 
periods when workers first entered the US to live or work.  The latter reflects the broad 
legalization through the SAWs program for those who were in the US and working prior to the 
passage of IRCA in 1986, and the relative difficulty of acquiring legal status since 1986.  The 
direction of influence signaled by the after 2001 coefficient suggests that foreign farm workers 
were less likely to gain legal status following the September 2001 terrorist attacks; this makes 
sense given that enforcement efforts and security were heightened in the US following that 
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 event.  Arguably legal status would have been more difficult to attain with the additional checks 
and safeguards that were put in place.  That is not to say that the tightening on legal status would 
have necessarily had a significant adverse effect on foreign farm workers; if anything, these 
workers are more likely to have migrated illegally across the US border with Mexico.  The 
magnitude of the after 1986 dummy suggests that legal status has been difficult to acquire since 
the last major legalization in 1986 (the SAWs program).  The farm work weeks effect indicates 
that more weeks of farm work reduce the likelihood of having legal status.   
Table 4 presents the parametric model wage results for the treated and untreated worker 
groups.  Wage results for the nonparametric methods (polynomial, nonparametric I, 
nonparametric II) are reported in Table 5.
5  All parameter estimates have the expected direction 
of influence on the wage results, and the parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance; the exceptions are the foreign farm work experience and age variables in the treated 
and non-treated groups, respectively.  For both groups, the magnitude and statistical significance 
of the piece rate and after 2001 estimates suggest dominant influences on farm wages relative to 
the other variables of the model.   
Table 6 reports the estimated treatment effects of legalization which are all positive.  The 
average treatment effect (ATE) reflects the expected gain for a random foreign farm worker who 
became legalized, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) indicates the return to 
those workers who became legalized, and the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATEU) 
indicates the potential return for those who were not legalized. The order of magnitude of the 
estimates generated by each method indicates positive sorting on the gains associated with 
legalization (ATET>ATE>ATEU), wherein those foreign workers who were most likely to 
                                                 
5 The three nonparametric estimators are different alternatives to assuming normality of the disturbances (Heckman, 
Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006b). 
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 participate in the legalization program benefited the most from it – more so than the average 
person and more so than their cohorts who were not legalized.   
A comparison of the different estimation methods shows a striking difference between the 
parametric and nonparametric methods in the magnitude of sorting gains from legalization.  The 
sorting gains are the difference between the ATET and ATE estimates – the average gains for the 
worker who opts for treatment (legalization) versus the worker who randomly selects into 
treatment.  The parametric method reports the smallest sorting gain of the four estimation 
methods: the average earnings gain for the legalized (treated) foreign worker was 0.0023, 
implying that the average earnings gain to legalization was 0.23% greater than the average 
earnings gain for the average foreign worker who randomly selected into legalization.  The gains 
for the nonparametric methods (polynomial, nonparametric I, and nonparametric II) range from 
3.16% to 6.57%.   
A comparison of the estimates reported within shows significant differences in the 
magnitude of average returns to legalization for the treated (legalized) and untreated (non-
legalized) groups.  The parametric method estimates are the exception in this respect: earnings 
gains average 10% across the board irrespective of treatment status.   The differentials are largest 
for the nonparametric I method, followed by the nonparametric II and polynomial methods, 
respectively.  The average earnings gain for the untreated (ATEU) range between 15% and 18%, 
and those for the treated (ATET) range between 24% and 26%.  The ATEU are particularly 
informative as they suggest the potential gains of a future legalization for workers, most of 
whom would have entered the US after the SAWs program.     
The relevant support for each marginal treatment effect (MTE) is given by the propensity 
score frequencies for foreign workers who were treated (legalized) and untreated (not legalized) 
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 shown in Figure 1.  The marginal treatment effects generated by each method are shown in 
Figure 2 through Figure 5.  The MTE is evaluated at values at which the propensity score ( ) ( ) z P  
and unobservable factors ( ) are equivalent (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006a; 2006b).  
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) emphasize the role of the unobservable characteristics in the 
interpretation of the MTE: for smaller values of the unobservables (u
d u
d) (points closer to zero on 
the x axis), the MTE is the expected benefit for individuals who are more likely to participate in 
treatment and who would participate even if the mean scale utility (µd(Z)) were small.  
Conversely, for larger values of ud the mean scale utility (µd(Z)) would have to be much larger to 
induce individuals’ participation in treatment and they are less likely to participate.  The MTE 
may also be interpreted as the mean gain for persons with observable characteristics (X) who 
would be indifferent between acquiring legal status or not, and may be viewed as a willingness to 
pay (WTP) measure if the outcomes are value outcomes (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007a; 2007b).   
The latter interpretation of the MTE is useful given the findings depicted in Figures 2 
through 5 which seem to conflict with the positive sorting on the gains indicated by the average 
treatment effect parameters.  Figure 2, which is based on the parametric method, suggests that 
the worker who became legalized (on account of having a low ud ) benefited less than the worker 
who was  not legalized (on account of having a high ud).  Although this is difficult to reconcile 
with the positive sorting on the gains indicated by the average treatment effect parameters, the 
WTP interpretation of the MTE may offer reasonable explanation.  The upward slope of Figure 2 
would therefore suggest an increasing willingness to pay by workers who have larger 
unobservables that usually would make them less eligible for participation in the program.  The 
increasing ud values may be indicative of idiosyncratic enhanced productivity, and a larger 
willingness to pay for legal status in order to permit more options to earn better returns.     
15 
 The MTEs generated by the nonparametric methods shown in Figures 3 through 5 are quite 
different from the parametric MTE.  Again, the WTP interpretation may offer some explanation 
for the three different segments exhibited by the MTEs along the ud range.  On the downward 
sloping segments, individuals who have lower unobservables are more likely to participate in a 
legalization program and exhibit a large willingness to pay for legal status acquisition.  Toward 
the middle segment of the MTEs (~0.51) however, it is possible that workers are more difficult 
to categorize in terms of legal status on the basis of their observable and unobservable 
characteristics and therefore are the least willing to pay for legal status relative to other 
individuals.  Individuals with high unobservables fall within the upper segment of the MTE.  
They exhibit high willingness to pay for legal status, arguably because they have a lower 
likelihood of gaining legal status due to unfavorable unobservable characteristics.  On account of 
the lower likelihood of becoming legalized, these individuals are likely to have fewer options for 
employment in other sectors but may possibly be more productive than their cohorts with legal 
status.     
 Policy Implications 
Much of the political warring over immigration reform stems from proposed legalization 
of unauthorized immigrants – whether it would reward illegal behavior and encourage future 
illegal immigration or whether it would serve the nation’s interests better to adjust unauthorized 
workers to legal status to prevent shocks to the labor intensive industries that mostly hire them.  
In addressing these issues, AgJOBS seeks to stabilize the crop farm workforce that is extremely 
vulnerable to immigration reform that may affect labor supply, wages and labor costs. 
The average treatment effect on the untreated (ATEU) parameter offers key insight as to 
how earnings may be potentially affected by a legalization program such as AgJOBS.  The 
average earnings gains range from 0.1002 to 0.1784, suggesting potential earnings increases 
16 
 between 10% and 18% for unauthorized workers that become adjusted to legal status.  The 
findings are broadly consistent with previous work that assessed the earnings implications of 
legalization.  Isé and Perloff (1995) estimated average wage increases of about 15% for 
unauthorized workers that are granted amnesty; if they were to become permanent residents 
however, their wages would increase by about 12%.  Iwai, Emerson and Walters (2006a) found 
that unauthorized workers who gained legal status would, in general, earn higher wages.  Wages 
would increase by as much as 31%: for example, unauthorized workers who selected into 
temporary authorized status had wage increases between 6% and 31% after 2001.
6    
Such results suggest cost increases for farm employers of unauthorized workers.  Given 
the large percentage of the farm workforce that is currently unauthorized for US employment, 
the increased cost may be substantial for employers with large proportions of unauthorized 
workers among their crews, and for whom labor costs comprise significant portion of total cost.  
Employers may respond by using other production factors more intensively; Napasintuwong 
(2004) suggested that the degree of intensity to which capital and labor are used in agriculture 
have been affected by the availability of immigrant labor, which is in turn affected by 
immigration policy.     
Concluding Remarks 
This study sought to analyze the potential impact of proposed legalization on the wage 
outcomes of foreign farm workers. The results provide some insight as to how future legalization 
could impact farm wages and, by extension, labor costs for employers.  The key distinction 
between this study and previous work is analytical framework: this study approached the 
problem from a treatment effects perspective with legalization modeled as a policy intervention 
                                                 
6 These are based on specific simulations that account for location, time, payment type, etc.  See Iwai, Emerson and 
Walters (2006a) for details.  
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 or treatment. The application of this analytical framework is a significant contribution to the 
literature on immigration policy evaluation and farm labor markets as it had not been previously 
applied in this context.  The study also assumed that essential heterogeneity existed, meaning 
that workers would not only display different responses to treatment but would also select into 
treatment based on idiosyncratic gains. The test of essential heterogeneity suggested by 
Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006a) was used to show that this assumption was indeed 
supported by the data.   
The results show an overall positive impact of legalization on farm worker outcomes.  
There is positive sorting on the gains from legalization, implying that foreign workers who 
specifically sought legalization benefited more than the average worker and even more so than 
their cohorts who had not been legalized.  The magnitude of gain is sensitive to the method of 
estimation used, with modest increases noted for the parametric method relative to the 
nonparametric methods.  The findings from the marginal treatment effects are not entirely clear, 
and seem to conflict in most respects with the average treatment effect results.  Given the stark 
differences between the parametric and nonparametric methods, it would appear that the 
assumption of joint normality (on which the parametric method is based) is not supported by the 
data.  However, this is not to imply that the nonparametric MTEs offer less ambiguous 
interpretations.  As they are presently, they are somewhat difficult to reconcile with the findings 
suggested by the positive sorting gains suggested by the average treatment effect parameters. If 
the MTEs are viewed in the context of willingness to pay measures however, the interpretations 
seem reasonable. Clearly, these findings suggest a need for future research.  A likely starting 
point would be additional refinement of estimates based on the nonparametric methods as the 
normality assumption appears problematic. Most importantly, the results show that unauthorized 
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 workers may potentially gain from future legalization, with wage increases by as much as 18%.  
In this respect, the cost implications for farm employers are clear in that labor costs would 
increase if amnesty were to be granted to workers who are currently unauthorized.  Whether this 
may encourage employers to shift to more capital intensive methods of production over time 
would depend on the magnitude of the cost increase and the degree of stringency and 
effectiveness of future legislation in controlling illegal immigration and employment. 
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 Table 1  Explanatory variables of the choice and parametric wage regression models 
Variable





Natural logarithm of the real farm wage in 2006 dollars.  
Conversions from the nominal wage were made using the consumer 
price index for all urban consumers 
 
Legal status 
=1 if farm worker is authorized for U.S. employment (citizen, 
permanent resident, or has other work authorization) 
= 0 if otherwise (i.e. unauthorized) 
 
Piece rate 
= 1 if worker is paid by piece rate 
= 0 if otherwise (by the hour, hour/piece combination, or salary) 
 
Seasonal worker 
=1 if worker is employed on a seasonal basis 
= 0 if otherwise (year-round) 
 
Female 
=1 if female 
=0 if male 
 
Mexican 
= 1 if worker is of Mexican nationality  
=0 if otherwise 
 
Education 
Highest grade level of education completed by the farm worker, 




=1 if worker had attended any adult education classes or school in 
the U.S. 
=0 if otherwise 
 
After 1986 
Dummy variable reflecting years before and after 1986 when 
foreign workers entered the United States for the first time to live or 
work 
 
After 2001  
 










= 1 if ‘none at all’ 
= 2 if ‘a little’ 
= 3 if ‘somewhat’ 
= 4 if ‘well’  
Married  = 1 if ‘married/living together’ 
=0 if otherwise 
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 Table 1. Continued. 
Variable   Definition 
Years with current 
employer 
 
Number of years of employment worker has completed with current 
employer.  One year is measured as one or more days per year 
(NAWS) 
 
Farm work weeks 
 
Farm work weeks completed in the last year 
 
 
Foreign farm work 
experience 
=1 if worker had been employed in agriculture, either full-time or 
part-time, while living in native (foreign) country 
=0 if worker had been employed in non-agricultural sector or had 
never worked while living in native (foreign) country 
 
Grower 
= 1 if employed by a grower 
= 0 if employed by a farm labor contractor 
 
Age  Respondent age in years 
 
Age
2 Age squared 
 
Experience  Years of U.S. farm work 
 
Experience
2 Experience squared 
 
Farm work in the 
last year 
 
Months of US farm work in the previous year (prior to work grid 
estimate) 
Weeks spent 
abroad  Number of weeks abroad last year 
a Data were sourced from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (1989-2006).  Definitions enclosed in quotation 
marks are as they appear in the NAWS Codebook.  
b This would include English/ESL, citizenship, literacy, job 
training and Adult Basic Education classes, GED/high school equivalency classes, college or university classes, and 
Even Start and Migrant Education classes.
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 Table 2  Summary statistics of foreign farm workforce, NAWS, 1989-2006 
  N=19152 workers N1=8097 workers N0=11055 workers







Lnwage  2.0351 0.2513 2.0876 0.2603 1.9966 0.2372
Weeks Spent 
Abroad  6.6531 12.2887 3.7974 8.4420 8.7447 14.1097
Specialty  Crop  0.7986 0.4011 0.8176 0.3862 0.7846 0.4111
Adult  Education  0.2007 0.4005 0.2812 0.4496 0.1417 0.3487
After  1986  0.6148 0.4867 0.2577 0.4374 0.8763 0.3293
After  2001  0.5198 0.4996 0.4763 0.4995 0.5517 0.4973
Female  0.1615 0.3680 0.1860 0.3891 0.1436 0.3507
Married  0.6314 0.4824 0.7866 0.4097 0.5177 0.4997
English    1.7231 0.8278 2.0042 0.9055 1.5172 0.6974
Mexican  0.8873 0.3163 0.8697 0.3366 0.9001 0.2998
Education  5.9630 3.2826 5.7599 3.4046 6.1118 3.1821
Experience  10.4756 9.0697 16.6972 9.1572 5.9188 5.6548
Age 33.7474  11.8152 39.9809 11.3513 29.1819  9.9084
Farm Work Done 
Last Year  7.4226 4.3196 8.6284 3.3334 6.5394 4.7268
Years Since 
Immigration 11.9724  10.0984 19.1250 9.4763 6.7336  6.7813
Year With 
Employer  4.5438 4.8579 6.8092 6.1175 2.8846 2.6388
California  0.3957 0.4890 0.5081 0.5000 0.3134 0.4639
Grower  0.8003 0.3998 0.8185 0.3855 0.7871 0.4094
Piece  Rate  0.1839 0.3875 0.1601 0.3667 0.2014 0.4011
Seasonal  Worker  0.6873 0.4636 0.6698 0.4703 0.7002 0.4582
Farm Work 
Weeks  36.4671 14.5541 37.7998 12.8602 35.4910 15.6077
Foreign Farm 




 Table 3  Probit model estimates for legal status treatment 
Variable Parameter  Estimate
a Standard Error 
    
Constant -0.5119*** 0.0733
Farm Work Weeks   -0.0093*** 0.0010
Years with Employer  0.0680*** 0.0056
English 0.2464*** 0.0134
Years since Immigration  0.0563*** 0.0026
After 2001  -0.3544*** 0.0276
Weeks Spent Abroad  -0.0192*** 0.0013
After 1986  -0.7906*** 0.0402
a Triple asterisks (***) indicate statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4  Estimated parameters from parametric wage regressions for treated and untreated 
groups 
 Authorized  Status  (Treated) Unauthorized Status (Untreated)










        
Constant 1.68363*** 0.04438 1.73827***  0.01594
Age 0.00821*** 0.00205 0.00122  0.00083
Age sq.  -0.00012*** 0.00002 -0.00003**  0.00001
Farm Work Last Year  0.00530*** 0.00086 0.00386***  0.00055
Experience 0.00328*** 0.00111 0.00704***  0.00108
Experience sq.  -0.00005** 0.00002 -0.00019***  0.00004
English 0.03114*** 0.00467 0.01498***  0.00417
Female -0.06034*** 0.00785 -0.04470***  0.00555
Piece Rate  0.21334*** 0.00992 0.18298***  0.00746
Grower 0.07502*** 0.00651 0.05197***  0.00487
Seasonal Worker  -0.04230*** 0.00551 -0.01224***  0.00359
Education 0.00455*** 0.00095 0.00534***  0.00059
Foreign Farm Work 
Experience 0.00189 0.00569 0.01565***  0.00436
After 2001  0.11875*** 0.00496 0.06282***  0.00319
California 0.04137*** 0.00447 0.04523***  0.00408
Rho 0.04599*** 0.00799 0.03842***  0.00799
a, bTriple and double asterisks (***, **) indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels of significance, 
respectively. 
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 Table 5  Estimated beta coefficients and standard errors for the outcome equations estimated 












Coefficient S.Error Coefficient S.Error Coefficient  S.Error 
Constant 1.79182 0.02072 ---- ---- ---  ---
Age   -0.00115 0.00117 -0.00104 0.00118 -0.00115  0.00117
Age sq.  0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001  0.00002
Farm work last year  0.00192 0.00072 0.00180 0.00074 0.00192  0.00072
Experience 0.01189 0.00186 0.01282 0.00189 0.01189  0.00186
Experience sq  -0.00059 0.00010 -0.00065 0.00010 -0.00059  0.00010
English -0.00392 0.00530 -0.00418 0.00533 -0.00392  0.00530
Female -0.03970 0.00842 -0.03997 0.00827 -0.03970  0.00842
Piece rate  0.17784 0.00901 0.17786 0.00900 0.17784  0.00901
Grower 0.04105 0.00633 0.04085 0.00632 0.04105  0.00633
Seasonal worker  0.00011 0.00498 0.00033 0.00499 0.00011  0.00498
Education 0.00600 0.00084 0.00597 0.00084 0.00600  0.00084
Foreign farm work 
Experience 0.00620 0.00535 0.00630 0.00536 0.00620  0.00535
After 2001  0.06019 0.00683 0.05984 0.00650 0.06019  0.00683
California 0.04973 0.00376 0.04965 0.00376 0.04973  0.00376
Age*pscore 0.01188 0.00285 0.01167 0.00286 0.01188  0.00285
Age sq*pscore  -0.00016 0.00003 -0.00016 0.00003 -0.00016  0.00003
Farm work last 
year*pscore 0.00521 0.00164 0.00532 0.00168 0.00521  0.00164
Experience*pscore -0.00584 0.00251 -0.00652 0.00242 -0.00584  0.00251
Experience sq*pscore  0.00047 0.00010 0.00054 0.00010 0.00047  0.00010
English*pscore 0.03746 0.00746 0.03962 0.00745 0.03746  0.00746
Female*pscore -0.03008 0.01768 -0.02901 0.01753 -0.03008  0.01768
Piece rate*pscore  0.04276 0.01960 0.04278 0.01953 0.04276  0.01960
Grower*pscore 0.04555 0.01480 0.04666 0.01475 0.04555  0.01480
Seasonal 
Worker*pscore -0.04703 0.01385 -0.04818 0.01388 -0.04703  0.01385
Education*pscore -0.00254 0.00172 -0.00241 0.00174 -0.00254  0.00172
Foreign farm work 
Experience*pscore 0.00837 0.01151 0.00740 0.01152 0.00837  0.01151
After 2001*pscore  0.06955 0.01541 0.07020 0.01507 0.06955  0.01541
California*pscore -0.01112 0.00848 -0.01116 0.00844 -0.01112  0.00848
Pscore -0.15046 0.10896 ---- ---- ---  ---
Pscore
2 0.73697 0.44991 ---- ---- --- ---
Pscore
3 -2.20958 0.61096 ---- ---- --- ---
Pscore
4 1.47909 0.28288 ---- ---- --- ---
a’Pscore’ denotes the propensity score, which is the probability of becoming legalized. 
bThe outcome equation is 
estimated as a polynomial in the propensity score (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006).  
cThis is the LIV estimator 
from Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2005).  
dThis method combines the nonparametric I and the polynomial 
approach.   
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ATET   0.1043 0.2385 0.2635  0.2538
ATEU   0.1002 0.1784 0.1459  0.1616
ATE     0.1020 0.2069 0.1978  0.2031
Sorting gain  
(ATET-ATE) 0.0023 0.0316 0.0657  0.0507
 
a A test for essential heterogeneity in the treatment effects yielded an F-statistic (p value) of 18.19 (0.0000), 
indicating self-selection arising from heterogeneous and unobserved gains for individuals in the sample  (See 
Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006).  
bThe extent of selection bias is gauged with a comparison of the OLS and 
parametric model results: selection bias = OLS-ATET= 0.0359-0.1043= -0.0684.  It shows that the OLS estimate of 
the average effect of legalization on earnings is downward biased, indicating a 3.6% average earnings gain relative 
to the 10% average gain suggested by the ATET estimate in the parametric method.  The overall bias (OLS-ATE) is 
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Figure 2  Marginal treatment effect (MTE) of legalization for foreign farm workers (with 95% 
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Figure 3  Marginal treatment effect (MTE) of legalization for foreign farm workers (with 95% 
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Figure 4  Marginal treatment effect (MTE) of legalization for foreign farm workers (with 95% 
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Figure 5  Marginal treatment effect (MTE) of legalization for foreign farm workers (with 95% 
confidence intervals), nonparametric method II 
 
                                                 
i Excerpted from: Walters, L.M.  2008.  Three essays on immigration reform, worker self-selectivity and earnings  
in the U.S. farm labor market.  Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Florida. 
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